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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 19-2356 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 TAQUAN WRIGHT, 
  Appellant                                                                           
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-17-cr-00229-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Brian R. Martinotti  
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 22, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: January 23, 2020) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Appellant Taquan Wright pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin 
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense.  The District 
Court sentenced Wright to 106 months’ imprisonment.  He now appeals his sentence, 
arguing that the District Court failed to give adequate consideration to his mitigating 
evidence and that his sentence was greater than necessary to meet the purposes of 
sentencing.  Because we conclude that the District Court’s sentence was procedurally and 
substantively sound, we will affirm. 
I. 
In March 2017, Wright was pulled over by state law enforcement officers for 
driving with tinted windows and an obstructed license plate.  As one of the officers spoke 
to Wright, he noticed an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle, causing the 
officers to search the vehicle.  The search revealed, inter alia, prescription pills, a sum of 
U.S. currency, and a hidden compartment, which contained cocaine, heroin, and one 
loaded Smith & Wesson 9mm handgun.    
Wright was charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon,1 possession with intent to distribute 28 grams of cocaine base,2 possession with 
intent to distribute a detectable amount of heroin,3 and possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense.4   
                                                 
1 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
2 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). 
3 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). 
4 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wright pled guilty to possession with intent to 
distribute heroin and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense.  
Based on a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of III, he was subject 
to an advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months on the drug offense.  
However, because Wright was also subject to a consecutive, mandatory minimum 
sentence of 60 months under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), he was subject to a total advisory 
Guidelines range of 106 to 117 months. 
At sentencing, Wright argued for a downward variance.  In support, he relied on 
the purported unfairness of the consecutive, mandatory minimum sentence required for 
the firearm offense and provided evidence of his difficult upbringing, drug use, familial 
support and responsibilities, post-offense rehabilitation, and expression of remorse.  
Based on this evidence, Wright requested a sentence of 72 months, while the Government 
sought a sentence within the Guidelines range. 
After hearing from the parties, the District Court discussed Wright’s personal 
history and characteristics and acknowledged the several letters from family and friends 
submitted on his behalf.  It also discussed the seriousness of the offense, Wright’s 
“significant criminal history,” post-offense rehabilitative efforts, and expression of 
remorse.5   
                                                 
5 App. 114–20. 
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Having considered the parties’ submissions, arguments, and Wright’s statements 
during the hearing, the District Court denied Wright’s request for a downward variance 
and sentenced him to 106 months’ imprisonment.  This appeal followed. 
II.6 
Wright argues that the District Court erred by imposing a sentence that was both 
procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  We disagree. 
We ordinarily review both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a 
sentence for abuse of discretion.7  However, as Wright concedes, because he did not  
object to the procedural error at sentencing, it is reviewed for plain error.8  “The plain 
error test requires (1) an error; (2) that is ‘clear or obvious’[;] and (3) ‘affected the 
defendant’s substantial rights . . . .’”9  “If these conditions are met, we will exercise our 
discretion to correct the error if it ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.’”10 
A. Procedural Reasonableness 
Wright argues that the District Court’s sentence is procedurally unreasonable 
because it failed to “meaningfully consider the mitigating evidence offered in support of 
a variance.”11  In particular, he asserts that the District Court failed to “meaningfully 
                                                 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
7 United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 120 (3d Cir. 2014). 
8 See United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256–59 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
9 United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Molina-
Martinez v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016)).   
10 Id. (quoting Molina-Martinez, --- U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. at 1343). 
11 Appellant’s Br. 11.   
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consider” the effect of his “upbringing or extensive history of substance abuse” on his 
commission of the offenses.12  This argument fails. 
Part of a district court’s responsibility in imposing a procedurally sound sentence 
is to consider the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).13  While a court must consider the 
§ 3553(a) factors, it “need not make explicit ‘findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors 
if the record makes clear that the court took the factors into account in sentencing.’”14  
Further, “if a party raises a colorable argument about the applicability of one of the § 
3553(a) factors, the district court may not ignore it.  The court should address that 
argument as part of its ‘meaningful consideration’ of the sentencing factors.”15  Finally, 
“the district court must furnish an explanation” for its sentence “sufficient for us to see 
that the particular circumstances of the case have been given meaningful consideration 
within the parameters of § 3553(a).”16 
The record demonstrates that the District Court did not commit procedural error.  
At the outset, it noted that, although Wright faced a 60-month mandatory minimum 
sentence under § 924(c), it had the discretion to vary from the Guidelines under the drug 
count.  It then proceeded to consider Wright’s request for a variance and explicitly 
address arguments in support thereof.   
                                                 
12 Appellant’s Br. 23. 
13 See United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010). 
14 Id. (quoting United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
15 Id. (quoting United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
16 Id. at 216 (quoting United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
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After hearing at length from Wright’s counsel, the District Court discussed 
Wright’s personal history and characteristics, including his “troubled childhood,” lack of 
parental guidance, and substance abuse.17  In this regard, it recognized that Wright had 
“minimal guidance and support” growing up, and that his “residence . . . was effectively a 
drug den for his older aunts and uncles.”18  However, while the District Court 
acknowledged Wright’s upbringing and substance abuse, it found that this case did not 
involve “a quick fix by someone that needed quick cash to support a habit”; rather, 
Wright participated in a “calculated enterprise involving secret compartments in cars and 
storage units, clearly in a scheme of distribution.”19  The record thus contradicts Wright’s 
assertion that the District Court failed to consider his upbringing and substance abuse.  
Further, with regard to deterrence, the District Court briefly noted Wright’s 
“significant criminal history.”20  It also observed, however, that Wright had engaged in 
post-offense rehabilitative efforts and expressed remorse for his conduct.  Indeed, the 
District Court commended Wright for altering his life and discussed his employment, 
care for his children, and interest in obtaining a general equivalency diploma and 
commercial driver’s license.   
                                                 
17 App. 115, 119. 
18 App. 115. 
19 App. 115–16.  
20 App. 119.  The PSR shows that Wright was convicted of several criminal offenses as 
both a juvenile and an adult.  His convictions as an adult include possession with intent to 
distribute near a school and possession with intent to distribute near public housing, for 
which he was sentenced in state court to a six-year period of incarceration. 
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While recognizing Wright’s commendable rehabilitative efforts, the District Court 
also noted the very serious nature of the offense.  Wright was caught driving in a vehicle 
containing a hidden compartment, narcotics, and a loaded firearm, which, because of his 
prior felony conviction, he was prohibited from possessing.  Indeed, the District Court 
was ready to sentence Wright to the top of the advisory Guidelines range because it 
“found the conduct and the history so egregious,” but it declined to do so after hearing 
Wright’s arguments and statements during the sentencing hearing.21   
The District Court’s statements indicate that it explicitly and thoroughly 
considered the mitigating evidence, including Wright’s difficult upbringing and substance 
abuse, but found the evidence “insufficient to warrant a sentence lower than the 
Guidelines range.”22  Accordingly, we conclude that Wright’s sentence was procedurally 
reasonable and find no error, much less plain error.  
B. Substantive Reasonableness 
Wright also argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the 
District Court failed to properly consider the § 3553(a) factors and was therefore greater 
than necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing.  This argument also fails. 
To determine whether a sentence is substantively reasonable, we must consider 
“whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the 
                                                 
21 App. 120.  The District Court also recognized the “harsh” penalty under § 924(c) and 
Wright’s reliance on Dean v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017), but its 
statements during the hearing suggest that it found the loaded firearm near the drugs 
sufficient to justify a Guidelines sentence.  App. 116–18. 
22 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007). 
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factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”23  “[I]f the district court’s sentence is 
procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.”24  Where a sentence is procedurally sound, “reviewing courts are entitled to 
presume that a sentence within the advisory Guidelines is reasonable.”25  Finally, “the 
party challenging the sentence bears the burden of proving the sentence’s 
unreasonableness.”26 
Here, the District Court’s sentence was substantively reasonable.  First, Wright 
received a sentence at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range.  Second, as discussed 
above, the District Court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors and mitigating 
evidence that Wright submitted.  It carefully weighed Wright’s upbringing, substance 
abuse, criminal history, family circumstances, post-offense rehabilitative efforts, and 
remorse.  It also explained the seriousness of the offense, including that it was 
“troubl[ed]” by the hidden compartment, narcotics, and loaded firearm in the vehicle.27  
Upon considering these circumstances, the District Court concluded that the mitigating 
evidence did not warrant a variance on the drug count and that a 106-month sentence was 
                                                 
23 United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
24 United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
25 See Handerhan, 739 F.3d at 124. 
26 United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011). 
27 App. 114. 
9 
 
appropriate to meet the purposes of sentencing.  Its denial of Wright’s motion for a 
downward variance does not render the sentence substantively unreasonable.28  
We therefore conclude that Wright has not met his burden of showing that no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence.  Under our 
deferential standard of review, Wright’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of 
his sentence fails.  
III. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm. 
 
                                                 
28 See United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Nor do we find that a 
district court’s failure to give mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they 
deserve renders the sentence unreasonable.”). 
